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Abstract:  Economists report price rigidity in markets with oligopolistic 
structures, while explaining the phenomenon. If an oligopolistic firm raises 
prices, other prices will remain stable in oligopolistic firms, so we will see a 
significant decrease in sales volume in the firm which increased prices. To 
avoid this situation an oligopolistic company will not initiate price increases. 
If oligopolistic firms lower prices, other oligopolistic firms will reduce prices 
promptly and the result will be that of lower volume of sales - will sell the 
same physical volume of goods but at a lower price. To avoid this situation, 
the company will not initiate oligopolistic price decreases. 
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1.  Price rigidity in markets with 
oligopolistic structures 
Oligopolistic structure has been the 
subject of numerous investigations. 
Cournot, Bertrand, Galbraith, Nicholson 
are just some of the economists who have 
studied this topic. Oligopolistic market 
structure has a number of features that 
customize the market in relation to other 
structures. Thus, on the market, sellers are 
only a few large companies, their products 
are relatively homogeneous. Market entry 
is difficult, because of relatively high 
costs, to large firms and, unlike other 
market structures, the interdependence of 
oligopolistic firms is significant, their 
behavior being a strategic one. 
Oligopolistic firm's strategic behavior 
means that each action is considered in 
terms of its impact on other oligopolistic 
firms and their reactions, because of the 
strong interdependence between the 
companies on the market. Strategic 
behavior involves two important 
consequences. The first is that profit-
maximizing decisions of oligopolistic 
firms is not based on clearly defined rules, 
but on how it believes that other firms will 
act in response to these actions. The 
second is that the results of these decisions 
will depend on how other companies will 
act in response to these actions. 
 
2.  The general theory of price 
determination 
In specialist literature [1] we have found 
the general theory of oligopolistic market 
price determination, starting from the 
premise that there are some companies that 
produce a single homogeneous product, the 
market being perfectly competitive in 
terms of demand. Four possible models 
have been proposed. Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov • Vol. 4 (53) • No. 2 - 2011 • Series V 
 
 
230 
a. A quasi-competitive model: the price 
is accepted as required, fixed. This model 
is similar to perfect competition in which 
each firm accepts the price as being given. 
Each firm believes, probably incorrectly, 
that its decisions do not affect market 
price. Since on the Oligopolistic market 
there is only a small number of firms, their 
assumption will determine the competitive 
price formation. 
b. Collusive model: firms may conclude 
agreements on pricing. An alternative to 
the first model is the case in which a group 
of companies believe they can influence 
market prices and coordinate their 
decisions so as to obtain monopoly profits. 
Since their coordinated plan requires 
achieving a certain level of profit for all 
firms, the plan will establish how the 
expected monopoly profit will be split 
(should be as high as possible). This model 
has three shortcomings. First, most 
agreements are illegal. Second, this model 
requires the acquisition by the parties to 
the agreement of information on demand 
and marginal cost of each firm, and some 
of them may be reluctant to provide them. 
Thirdly, the most important danger is 
lurking instability. If oligopoly managers 
lack the ability to control this risk, the 
cartel will collapse. 
c. Cournot model:  each firm believes 
that its decisions influence the price. 
French economist Augustin Cournot 
formal analysis conducted in 1838 
regarding duopolist behavior has shown 
that this strategy can lead to obtaining a 
higher profit to that of a cartel. 
d. The conjectural variations model: 
the profit of a firm responds to changes in 
the profit of other firms. On oligopolistic 
markets (highly concentrated markets, 
such as automobiles, computers, energy), 
obviously, every company is thinking how 
others will respond to their decisions. 
Economics problem was how to express 
the strategic decisions in a short analytical 
model. Such is the game theory [1] model 
that was developed since 1920. Basics of 
game theory were introduced in the work 
of  John von Neumann  and  Oscar 
Morgenstern,  The Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior, published in 1944. 
They have defined the game as any 
interaction between various agents, 
governed by a set of specific rules that 
determine the possible moves of each 
participant and earnings for each 
combination of moves. This description can 
be applied to almost any social 
phenomenon. Thus, people realize that 
their actions result depends not only on 
how we shape them, but also the actions of 
other participants. From the simplest to the 
most complicated decisions, the decisions 
ranging from private and public, they can 
be scientifically analyzed using game 
theory. Thus, game theory has found many 
applications in social sciences, including 
economics.  Game theory uses three 
fundamental assumptions: players behave 
rationally, everyone knows that others are 
rational, all players know the rules. To 
understand a game, it is necessary to know 
the rules, as to find out which actions are 
allowed (possible) at some point. Then, 
you need to know how the players choose 
an action from the set of possible   
actions. [2] 
In economic terms, a game is actually a 
competition where each firm tries to 
maximize profit, but it depends on the 
reaction of other firms. In a market where 
there are only a few companies, 
competition has a strategic character. The 
game is an activity that takes place after 
explicit or implicit rules and to obtain the 
desired results, players need more strategy, 
that is action plans designed as reactions to 
other players actions. Games can be zero-
sum and positive-sum. The zero-sum 
describes situations in which players have 
opposite interests, so that a player gains are 
the others losses. Positive-sum games are 
more suited to reality, since both players 
can win at the same time. They can be Ciobanu, R.: Considerations regarding price in oligopolistic structured markets 
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based on cooperation or no cooperation. 
Cooperation can be achieved by the end of 
tacit or explicit arrangements, followed 
voluntarily or by coercion. Constraint may 
take the form of lighter, such as threat, or 
hard, such as applying rules, An Eye for an 
eye, tooth for tooth and If caught Cheating 
– you are Removed. Using these methods 
we determine that the temptation to cheat 
is  minimal and long-term results of 
simultaneous or infinite to be maximal. [3] 
In a oligopolistic market, each firm must 
be concerned with how his behavior and 
decisions affect the market price 
competition. The study of these issues has 
led economists to develop a model case of 
the conjectural variation model that is the 
price leader (price leadership). This model 
is based on the assumption that the market 
is composed of a price leader, a company 
that sets the product price in that market, 
and other quasi-marginal competitors. This 
model explains very difficult how the price 
leader is chosen and what happens when a 
company decides to change the price to 
overcome the leader and occupy the first 
position. It raises two important questions 
about the nature of oligopolistic 
equilibrium. On the one hand, which is the 
relationship between the total number of 
firms and final balance? In general, it is 
considered that if the number of firms 
increases, equilibrium oligopolistic 
competitive solution approaches. On the 
other hand, how the equilibrium price 
changes from one period to another? In 
general, the analysis of oligopoly is 
confined to a single period so that 
companies can not obtain information 
about rivals' reactions and use them in 
future periods. [4] 
 
3. Oligopolistic behavior analysis 
Going through the abovementioned 
models we can formulate some 
conclusions about the behavior of 
economic agents on the oligopolistic 
market. Economic agents may conclude 
agreements, express or implied, regarding 
the price to be practiced on the market. 
The express ones face difficulties 
regarding the execution, masking and 
compliance with them permanently being 
in danger of not being respected. The tacit 
or implicit ones call for coordination of 
price without ,,conspiracy” in the classic 
sense of the term, without communicating 
or committing other detectable acts. This 
phenomenon has been called, conscious 
parallelism, and for the special case of 
oligopoly phenomenon known in 
economics as the ,,oligopolistic 
interdependence” or ,,tacit collusion”. [5] 
Explicit price fixing agreements are 
prohibited by antitrust laws and in trials 
with this object is trying to answer the 
question whether or not the parties 
concluded an agreement courts requiring 
this evidence (such as the practice of 
uniform prices consistently or written 
evidence regarding the agreement, 
meetings, consultations). If no such 
evidence can be brought forward, the 
agreements are beyond the scope of 
antitrust law and this solution is somewhat, 
natural if we consider that judges and 
lawyers are not at all familiar with the 
economic theory on pricing. This approach 
to issues of anti-competitive agreements or 
antitrust policy has brought damages to the 
effectiveness of antitrust policy in the 
world, distorting the efforts of the 
competition supervisors. Most often 
sanctioned were price-fixing attempts, 
since the actual uniformisation of price 
could not be proven by magistrates.  
Resources were wasted for small cases, 
major cases remain undiscovered or 
unproven. Increasingly more, courts and 
enforcement authorities use economic 
instruments to identify market segments 
that are prone to price fixing - those market 
segments where research can be successful 
-  and to highlight the fact that the price 
practice is significantly higher than a 
competitive one. Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov • Vol. 4 (53) • No. 2 - 2011 • Series V 
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The case of the oligopolistic market 
structure raises the question whether the 
practice should be treated as a uniform 
price tacit understanding (and therefore 
punished) or be treated as dictated by 
oligopolistic market structure and not the 
choice of companies (and therefore should 
not be punished). In economic theory there 
is talk about the oligopolistic 
interdependence as follows. In a market 
with many sellers with equal power, the 
individual seller is too small to influence 
market prices. He will sell at market prices 
and not higher than this. He will be able to 
drop the price and by this action bring 
additional customers (a small fraction of 
the total), but will not substantially 
increase supply. He should not worry how 
others sellers will react. The fewer 
companies, the higher the market share 
held by them and the initiative to decrease 
price is less in competition. In an 
oligopolistic system, anyone of the large 
firms in that market will be able to set a 
lower price than tacitly agreed between 
them. This will lead to a general loss of 
control over price. All companies know 
this danger and do not condone such 
behavior and there, is a tacit agreement to 
respect the fixed price, almost perfectly 
respected. Price decline is considered  a 
hostile action. The company that lowers 
the price itself may suffer losses, so that 
the tacit agreement will be respected by 
everyone in the legal conditions and 
appearance of honesty. It is a remarkable 
example of the ability to identify and meet 
community interests when it comes to 
money, the famous economist J. K. 
Galbraith observed. [6] 
In an Oligopolistic market, where there 
are few major vendors, if one of them 
reduces the price, this measure leads to a 
substantial increase in its sales and 
corresponding decrease in sales of others. 
Anticipating a prompt response from 
rivals, which will eliminate the advantage 
by reducing in turn the price, the seller 
concentrated market will not take the 
initiative to reduce the price as in a 
atomized market. Those  in favor of 
oligopolism live in an interdependence in 
fixing the price, they rely on the 
opponent's reaction and, consequently, 
they will avoid rigorous competition in 
prices. 
Donald Turner, in an article published 
in 1962, wonders whether this 
interdependence should be seen as a price 
fixing agreement in violation of antitrust 
law. [7] Oligopolistic price can be 
described as an individual rational decision 
in the light of economic facts. Turner 
argues that there is no adequate legal 
sanctions applicable to oligopolistic 
interdependence. Thus, a sanction 
prohibiting each defendant to take into 
account the likely price reduction by 
competitors, it requires irrational behavior, 
which is impossible. Then, even if the ban 
should be stated to be effective, should 
require defendants to reduce prices to limit 
production costs (cost plus profit), which 
would put the court in a position to 
regulate prices, a thing which is not 
competent to do. Also, monitoring and 
enforcing price (public regulation) through 
government structures (agencies, 
government) resort is used less globally. 
Regarding  a sanction to liquidate these 
companies, meaning their disappearance 
from the market, Turner mentioned it as a 
structural remedy for a bad behavior 
problem. Turner identified a possible 
remedy: division of oligopolistic firms in 
small companies. 
It seems that Turner's analysis is almost 
flawless, yet it brings some criticisim from 
antitrust literature. [5] It says that the 
theory exaggerates the impact of price 
reduction in an oligopolistic structure, as 
assumed that the response to this reduction 
will be immediate. This is not true, since in 
reality time is running out, a longer or 
shorter period, in which the company that 
has reduced the price makes a substantial Ciobanu, R.: Considerations regarding price in oligopolistic structured markets 
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profit. This time lag can be amplified in 
the presence of factors such as: the ability 
to mask price reduction or other sellers 
unable to rapidly expand production to 
meet increased demand at a lower price. 
Reduce the price impact can still be 
mitigated in some cases (only some of the 
competitors will move customers to the 
company that has reduced the price, the 
price reduction was operated only for a 
segment of its production, competitors 
believe that the company will increase the 
price very soon) and then wears off and the 
response to this reduction of the market. 
Only a great price reduction can produce 
dramatic effects under oligopoly. If rivals 
will lose a lot of sales, they will want to 
counter this loss by increasing production. 
Economic research has shown that any 
concentrated market, in which the price is 
equal to the cost (price competitive or 
equilibrium), tends to concentrate even 
more. One of the companies will increase 
prices above the competitive one and the 
others will do the same thing because they 
realise that they would earn more by 
charging the price (according to the 
prediction of the initial company price 
increase). On the oligopolistic market, 
once reached equilibrium, the decision to 
raise prices is avoided because it will lead 
to lower sales volume. Another aspect 
would be that, where a company decides to 
increase the price, one company could 
increase prices more slowly than the other, 
trying to profit at the expense of other 
(attracting a greater number of customers). 
Thus, it seems that every competitor is 
forbid to practice price leadership, 
knowing that others will be tempted to 
obtain short-term profit at its expense, 
delaying the price increase. 
Regarding the choice of a company to 
reduce the price it will bring additional 
profit - by increasing the number of clients 
- the time needed for other companies will 
also reduce the price. Losing customers, 
competitors will also reduce the price so 
that all firms on a long-term will register 
losses because they will be forced to sell 
more to make the same profits. Hence the 
reluctance of oligopolists in terms of price 
reduction. However, such behavior can not 
be excluded.  Do not forget that lower 
prices mean more customers, increasing 
the quantity sold and therefore the need for 
enhanced supply, production, sales. 
George Stigler  [8] has developed an 
alternative approach to oligopoly, where 
the oligopoly price deal as a special case of 
price collusion. The rational decision of a 
firm to enter into an agreement, tacit or 
express, is taken after a careful cost 
analysis  -  income. Examining the factors 
that influence these costs and revenues we 
can identify those market structures that 
promote collusion and require very little 
communication.  If we identify, the 
economical symptoms of collusion we an 
solve the problem and/or prevent it. 
 
4. Factors that predispose to collusion 
According to Stigler's theory, economic 
analysis of collusion must go through two 
stages: (1) identify those markets where 
conditions are conducive to collusion and 
(2) determine whether those markets are or 
not really practicing a collusive price. We 
make a further analysis of the factors that 
create conditions favorable conclusion 
cartel. 
A.1.  Concentration of a market.  For 
quantification we use indicators such as 
market share held by major firms in 
number of 4 or 8 or the Herfindahl - 
Hirschman Index (HHI). Whatever 
indicator we use, the literature does not 
indicate a threshold above which the 
collusive price can become attractive. The 
views of economists are not converging in 
terms of a concentration threshold above 
which it becomes dangerous, some say we 
should worry about when the four major 
companies together have 70-80% of the 
market, while others argue that the Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov • Vol. 4 (53) • No. 2 - 2011 • Series V 
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threshold of 45% is  already  
dangerous. [9] 
A.2. Lack of small sellers.  If four 
companies hold 80% of the market, not 
whether the remaining 20% is owned by 2 
or 10 companies. Price coordination 
between firms is easier between 6 than 14 
companies. The Market share permanently 
unoccupied is in the cartel’s people 
attention. 
A.3. Inelastic demand at competitive 
prices.  If on the relevant market of a 
product, it is not easily substitutable at the 
current price charged, we have evidence 
that the demand for that product is 
inelastic. And if demand is inelastic at 
current market price when the price 
increases to the cartel prices it becomes 
very attractive - the total profit increases 
while costs decrease as production drops 
(the cartel acts as a monopolist). 
A.4. Market entry is difficult. We must 
take into account the specific sector or 
branch. Barriers that make entry may be 
required by law, such as permits, capital, 
dues or high taxes or may be determined 
by specific activity, namely the high cost 
that it involves the organization of work 
(purchase of machinery, equipment, 
installations, raw materials, labor cost, 
long lead times necessary to organize 
work). 
A.5.  The possibility to purchase the 
remaining part of an unconcentrated 
market. We have already shown that the 
market segment which is concentrated is 
always in the attention of large companies, 
encouraging collusion. 
A.6. Standard products.  The less the 
production is standardized, meaning that 
production is small series, they are unique 
or customized products, the price-fixing 
cartels will be harder to accomplish. These 
products are not favorable to market 
collusion. Per a contrario the high degree 
of standardization promotes agreements. 
A.7. Durable products. If, for example, 
a farmer buys a drill, whose operation is 
guaranteed 10 years, he ensures the 
production of 10 future crops, while a 
vendor selling sowers will lose 10 sales. 
Lost profits creates the temptation to cheat, 
the favorable conclusion being that of 
agreements on price. On the opposite side 
there is a market for short-lived, including 
perishable products. 
A.8. Uniform prices.  If thes producer 
practices the same price in relation to all 
en-gross seller there is a likelihood for 
them to conclude agreements on the low 
retail price regarding that they have 
different costs. The imposition and 
enforcement is difficult and that agreement 
is not effective. 
A.9. The difficulty of price 
competition. It is the most important form 
of competition. Price reduction is a safe 
method to attract customers, the more 
attractive it is if the product life is short. 
They Seller may increase the cost of other 
forms of competition (advertising, quality, 
security, presentation) even at the cost of 
the entire profit erosion, and after he 
reached and grabbed for the desired market 
segment, it will raise prices above 
competitive. 
A.10. The large share of fixed costs. 
[10] In a market where fixed costs have a 
large share in the total cost, competition 
can easily lead to bankruptcy. Fixed costs, 
by definition, can not be adjusted to any 
decline in demand, so a company with high 
fixed costs is vulnerable to any economic 
change as it is forced to reduce production 
or reduce prices, because revenues will be 
reduced much faster than costs. The 
company, taking into account this will be 
inclined to charge higher prices than the 
competitive price. 
A.11. Cost structure and similar 
production processes. The companies are 
more like in terms of production and cost 
structure, the easier will be the conclusion 
of agreements on price. Cartel price will be 
based on costs that companies and firms Ciobanu, R.: Considerations regarding price in oligopolistic structured markets 
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with different cost structures and 
manufacturing will hardly form a cartel. 
A.12. Demand is constant or decreases 
over time. Agreements are more difficult 
to achieve in a market where demand 
increases over time, only one in which 
demand is constant or even registers a 
decrease. A firm outside the cartel 
constituted on a market where demand is 
falling or constant will not suffer because 
they lose customers, but because it fails to 
attract new ones and keep pace with the 
rapid growth of competitors. If demand 
decreases and fixed costs are high, entry is 
not attractive, resulting in a favorable 
situation of collusion. 
A.13. Prices may change quickly. If a 
company reduces the price of his product, 
how quickly competitor may also reduce 
the price, the less profitable will be the 
reduction  in price. But the price decline 
implies a prior analysis of efficiency which 
may delay the response. The more difficult 
the change of the price, the greater will be 
the time in which to profit from the 
discount. 
A.14. Auctions.  To avoid corruption, 
public  institutions contract services and 
works through auctions. Agreements on 
price can be detected if identical offers are 
made or if a bid price is very low 
compared to that provided by other offers. 
A.15. A local market. The smaller the 
market the more favorable it is with both 
concentration and collusion. The fewer the 
sellers, they will communicate much more 
easily, no need for written agreements that 
can be used as evidence in court. 
Commitments made by firms in the local 
market will be respected, because violation 
would bring a bad reputation. 
A.16. The existence of cooperative 
practices.  The degree to which firms 
cooperate (exchange information on costs, 
prices) in the forms permitted by antitrust 
laws, differs from one industry to another. 
The closer relations between firms, the 
smaller transaction costs of collusion are 
and appear more likely. 
After we established during the first 
phase if the market is favorable or not for 
collusion, we need to seek economic 
evidence with which to demonstrate the 
actual price collusion. We can several 
pieces of evidence. 
B.1. Allocation of market segments. If 
large firms have equal market segments 
mantained for a long time this is proof that 
they have divided the market by allocating 
geographical areas or by allocating sales 
quotas, thus eliminating competition 
between them. In terms of competing 
companies which are fighting each other 
for customers and sales the market 
segments held vary. 
B.2. Price discrimination.  Price 
discrimination practices means the sale of 
identical products to different customers at 
different prices, even if it generates the 
same cost. Price discrimination becomes 
an attractive strategy to increase profits. A 
systematic discrimination is evidence of 
monopoly or cartel because some 
consumers pay more than the cost of 
products, unlike a competitive market. 
B.3. Exchange of information on the 
price. Markets with many sellers exchange 
information on prices to contribute to a 
better base for them, avoiding losses due to 
lack of information, which therefore is 
favorable to competition and consumers. 
Markets with few sellers have an ignorance 
issue price which is less serious and 
therefore the exchange of information on 
prices can be considered a step towards 
cartelization. 
B.4. Regional variations in price. It is 
possible that a product be sold in different 
geographic markets at different prices 
through different costs. Most price-fixing 
agreements are regional or local rather than 
national, because sellers are fewer and 
there are smaller markets. Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov • Vol. 4 (53) • No. 2 - 2011 • Series V 
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B.5. Rigged auctions.  Aspects of the 
auctions have already been analyzed. 
B.6. Price, production and production 
capacity change with cartel formation. 
Successful formation of a cartel is usually 
followed by higher prices and reduced 
production, unexplained reduction in 
production costs. This is proof that a 
strategy was applied to price fixing, while 
changes in the opposite direction shows 
that the agreement was ruined. Another 
proof would be creating excess production 
capacity, unexplained by changes in 
demand or mismanagement. The existence 
of excess capacity demonstrates an 
unstable cartel in which cartel members 
fear that it will break up and maintain 
production capacity even though their 
production has decreased. If we have a 
stable cartel, production capacity  will be 
reduced in proportion to reduced 
production. 
B.7. Resale price maintenance in the 
entire industry may be evidence of 
cartelization. 
B.8. Diminishing market segments 
held by major companies.  Practicing 
price monopoly (cartel) attract new 
competitors tend to monopoly profits. 
Major companies that market will have 
two options: either to reduce prices to 
discourage new firms to enter the market 
to maintain prices and to accept the 
gradual reduction of market share held by 
them. The first alternative is contrary to the 
cartel and the colluders will give hardly the 
monopoly profit, so they usually take the 
latter. Thus, a long-term decline of major 
companies on the market can be a 
symptom of collusion, but of course the 
analysis must not stop here. 
B.9. Amplitude and fluctuation of 
price changes are relatively small. A 
monopoly and a cartel reacts more slowly 
to changes in costs and demand than the 
small vendors in a competitive market due 
to difficulties in negotiations. 
B.10. Elasticity of demand. It examines 
the evolution of this coefficient. 
B.11. Profit level.  We cannot on the 
basis of statistical analysis of profit levels. 
A large profit may result from 
cartelisation, as it can be the result of 
senior management and a low profit or no 
profit can be the result of mismanagement, 
as well the result of a cartel profit. 
B.12. The market price inversely 
proportional to the number of firms or 
elasticity of demand. The market is more 
concentrated and inelastic demand, the 
price will be higher (compared with 
competitive price). But this evidence must 
be received with caution and correlated 
with each other, as, for example, price 
increases may be due to increased 
production costs leading to market exit of 
less efficient firms and thus to market 
concentration. 
B.13. Price basis points.  This is a 
system in which vendors added to the 
selling price and the price of delivery - 
price includes transportation to the buyer - 
but does not calculate the price of transport 
from the factory, but from a point called 
the basic point. Thus, if the buyer is closer 
to point basis than factory price plus the 
cost of delivery will be lower than actual. 
If the buyer is closer to plant than basis 
points plus the cost of delivery price will 
be higher than real, what is called cashing 
seller ,,shadow transport". This practice 
can be used to draw customers closer and 
easily collect additional profits. It may 
conclude an agreement, tacit or express, in 
this respect. 
B.14. Exclusive practices.  Granting 
privileges to certain customers is an 
indication of collusion. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We can not say that there is difficulty in 
interpreting economic evidence on 
collusion, but they are not insurmountable. 
Evidence plays an important role in Ciobanu, R.: Considerations regarding price in oligopolistic structured markets 
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antitrust and evaluation processes. It would 
be improved if lawyers and judges would 
better understand economic phenomena. If 
the economic evidence presented in cases 
indicates that there was an understanding, 
there is no legal reason to insist on 
presenting new evidence showing if it was 
a tacit or explicit understanding, especially 
since legal presumptions are evidence. The 
fact that there was a communication 
between the parties or have made a proper 
scheme of price fixing is the only 
economist and not a sacred detail. 
There is no doubt about the tacit 
understanding of consideration as a form 
of anticompetitive practices, evidence that 
they are prohibited by antitrust laws, 
including Romanian. The problem is that 
oligopolistic firms increase prices, but that 
they will be motivated to grow more than 
justify the costs. If all firms apply the same 
pattern of growth is clear that it is a tacit 
understanding with which the supervisory 
authorities of competition and justice 
should not be lenient. 
So in a sense the alleged tacit 
understandings can be responses to 
externalities such as rising raw material 
costs, and this behavior cannot bring any 
reproach. But if companies adopt the same 
pattern of declining production and 
increasing prices above the competitive, 
there may be complaints that they have a 
tacit understanding. Recall the purpose of 
this analysis: to try to find answers to the 
question if oligopolistic structure, the 
practice of uniform prices to be treated as a 
tacit understanding and therefore should be 
punished or treated as dictated by 
oligopolistic market structure and therefore 
should not be sanctioned. We recall the 
argument of Turner: the assumption that 
firms’ oligopolistic behavior would not be 
a strategic one, they would be irrational. 
Overseeing competition authorities and 
courts could choose an answer enshrined in 
the economic theory of oligopolistic 
interdependence, but could pay attention to 
Professor R. Posner opinion establishing 
a rebuttable presumption of collusion to 
oligopolistic market structure: oligopoly is 
necessary and sufficient condition to tacit 
collusion. [5] In this last aspect all 
evidence must be considered, including 
whether or not the price is a over 
competitive one. 
The remedies provided for such actions 
is awarding damages, with which the 
injured could be compensated and the 
prohibition by law of tacit agreements. 
Fear of being condemned to pay damages 
could lead to oligopolistic companies to 
think twice before giving up business, 
relying on competition to reduce price 
reaction. [5] If tacit agreements are 
prohibited by law, as is the case with the 
Romanian legislation, fear of punishment 
would be a reason not to practice over 
competitive prices. Oligopolistic 
companies are irrational if they ignore this 
threat. 
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Notes 
 
[1] Nicholson, W.: op. cit.  Chapter  20 
Strategy and Game Theory,  
pp. 559-590, 591-611. 
[2] Contributions to the  explanation and 
development of game theory have been 
rewarded  over  time  by awarding  the 
Nobel Prize for Economics. Thus, John 
Forbes Nash, a professor at Princeton 
University in  New  Jersey,  was 
awarded  in1994 with  the award for 
fundamental analysis  of  
non-cooperative equilibrium in games, 
and Robert J. Aumann, a member of 
the National Academy of Sciences of 
the  States  United,  and  Thomas  C. 
Schelling, professor at the University 
of Maryland, received the 2005 Nobel 
Prize in  Economics  for their 
contribution  to the development of 
game theory. 
[3] Typically,  in economic theory 
distinguishes between  short  and  long 
term  without  defining  it  precisely. 
However,  there is a criterion  of 
demarcation.  Thus,  short-term trader 
has  limited flexibility  in its actions, 
while the  long term  he  enjoys  more 
freedom. 
[4] Friedman, J. W.: op.  cit. Chapter 11: 
Oligopoly Theory, pp. 491-534. 
[5] Posner, R.: op. cit. pp. 57-60, 96, 99. 
Professor distinguish between explicit 
or explicit collusion, or  express 
agreement  fixing  the price  on the 
market, specific  cartels  and  tacit 
collusion, that  tacit  agreement  fixing 
prices such as those that occur between 
oligopolistic firms. 
[6] Galbraith, J. K.: op. cit. p. 153. 
[7] Turner, D.: op. cit. p. 655, Turner 
graduated from Yale Law School and 
obtained his doctorate in economics at 
Harvard. He taught at Harvard and led 
the  Antitrust Division  of  the 
Department of Justice in the '60s. He 
was in the '50s and '70s antitrust, the 
first who made an economic analysis 
of antitrust law. 
[8] Stigler, G.: A Theory of Oligopoly, in 
The Organization of Industry, 1968, p. 
39, quoted in R. Posner Antitrust Law. 
Second Edition, op., pp. 60-61, Stigler 
G.  received the Nobel Prize  for 
Economics in 1982 for his studies on 
the functioning and market structure. 
[9] Romania  Competition Council 
identified in 2009, seven sectors with 
low degree of competition  in the 
Romanian economy: banking, retail 
trade, concessions, energy, 
pharmaceutical  industry,  the  liberal 
professions and taxi. See, in this sense, 
the Competition Council.  Academic 
Society  in Romania.  Single Market, 
National Market: competition policy in 
key sectors. 2009 http://www.consiliul 
concurentei.ro/documente/Raport. 
[10]  Fixed costs (rent paid for production 
facilities, insurance, banking, 
maintenanceand repairs,  depreciation, 
fuel and electricity, transport hire and 
other services provided by  third 
parties, such as  security services, 
sanitation, recruitment, training, 
consulting,  for example)  are those 
costs  that remain  unchanged  for a 
certain period  of time,  regardless of 
production and variable costs (wages, 
for example)  are  those costs which 
develops  in proportion to  volume 
production.  While variable costs  are 
highly flexible in that it easily adapts 
to  the level of production (resources 
are purchased as needed), fixed costs 
are not so easily adapted to reflect the 
resource needs.  However, the higher 
production volume increases, which is 
fixed cost per unit decreases. 
 